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“Well, no offence, but I don’t really think adults listen to us and they just want to
think what they think, especially if the kid is younger. And I think the kids should
be listened to as well as adults. I think they should be treated the way an adult is
treated and be allowed to have their say.”1

I.

Introduction

Institutional design in the modern state increasingly incorporates features from both
adversarial and inquisitorial models indicating considerable convergence.2 This chapter
examines the hybrid model provided by British Columbia’s Representative for Children
and Youth (RCY) and argues that the RCY offers important institutional insights
regarding the effectiveness of these types of investigative bodies found across Canada as
well as internationally. The paper also examines the evolution of procedural justice in this
substantive policy area. I will argue that the hybrid mode—at least with respect to
children—illustrates how procedural fairness serves substantive rights. To show this, the
paper does not engage in the substantive areas of family, health, education welfare or
1

The quote is taken from an interview with a child found in the Report of the Columbus Pilot study of case
management and the adversarial family law system by the Family Court of Western Australia. See Lisbeth
T. Pike and Paul T. Murphy, “Invisible Parties: Listening to Children—A Social Science Perspective,”
Paper presented at the Australian Family Law Conference, 24 October 2006, 1 at 12. Available at:
http://www.familycourt.wa.gov.au/_files/FLC%20Paper%20Oct06.pdf.
2
Voluminous discussion regarding the precise meaning of the words ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ exists.
For the purposes of this paper, I will maintain the common law understanding of adversarial and use
inquisitorial in the more open-ended sense of an investigative model not premised on bipolar relations with
an active public official at the head. On the key differences between adversarial and inquisitorial processes,
see Laverne Jacob’s paper “Building on the Ombudsman: Polyjuralism and Dispute Resolution in the
Canadian Access to Information Context” in this volume. For discussion of the adversarial-non adversarial
debate, see Chapter 2 in Australian Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 62 Review of the federal
civil justice system, Sydney 1999 (Available at:
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/dp/62/); A. Jolowicz, Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Models of Civil Procedure,” (2003) 52:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 281-295; and Arie
Freiberg, “Post-Adversarial and Post-Inquisitorial Justice: Transcending Traditional Penological
Paradigms,” (2010). Monash University Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010/17.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1609468.
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criminal policy and their accompanying areas of law but, rather, how the institutional
shift to a hybrid model indicates a kind of praxis in which the institution powers and
functions as well as the rights of the vulnerable persons they affect have broadened and
deepened. This enlargement of capacity is reciprocal, having been driven by internal
domestic legal reform, changes in attitudes and norms with respect to children’s
autonomy, rights and dignity, and the increasingly direct influence of international norms
such as those found in Articles 33 and 124 of the 1990 United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC).5

3

Article 3 provides that:
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her
well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and
administrative measures.
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or
protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities,
particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as
competent supervision.

4

Article 12 provides that:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.

5

Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3. Canada signed the Convention in 1990.
Parliament and nearly all of the provinces initially approved and the CRC was ratified in 1991. Alberta,
which later endorsed the Convention in 1999, did not support the CRC because it argued that the rights
contained in the document undermined parental authority. The CRC has not been automatically
incorporated into domestic legislation due to Canada’s federal structure. Nevertheless, Canada is obliged to
conform, the Convention can indirectly influence policy and laws, and some provinces have taken steps to
implement or incorporate the principles in specific statutes.
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Before examining the development and features of the Office of the Representative for
Children and Youth, the chapter will first provide an attenuated history of the
governance of children and earlier institutional models of state protection of child
welfare. The BCRCY will be contrasted with these earlier models in section III to
show its hybrid nature as well as its institutional strengths and vulnerabilities. The
final section will then consider the BCRCY in an international context in order to
situate it comparatively amongst other countries’ children’s representatives. A
comparative angle discloses that the general trend in Western countries has been to
create independent and stand-alone bodies, such as the BCRCY, with a specialized
focus on children.

II.

A Short Evolutionary Story

In order to see how the creation of the BCRCY marks a significant change to traditional
approaches to child welfare and the accompanying institutional architecture, I will first
provide a short genealogy encapsulating the historical development of different
approaches to children’s rights as well as norm change regarding children’s rights in
Western societies.

a.

From Victorian Mores to Social Welfare

Child welfare has been a government responsibility in British Columbia since 1919. As
with many jurisdictions at that time, a public official or single bureau was charged with
protecting neglected or otherwise vulnerable children only when parents were deemed
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incapable or negligent.6 The accompanying policy framework relegated responsibility for
children to the private sphere for care unless they were abandoned, significantly
endangered, neglected, or impoverished. Churches provided the civil society complement
to state care. Family matters not resolved in the private sphere, depending on family
resources, entered the legal system only in extreme cases of child abuse, children’s death,
or divorce. As passive, voiceless objects of parental or state control, children were neither
seen nor heard.

The alternately paternalistic and laissez-faire Victorian model shifted with the
development of the welfare state. Charged with multiple responsibilities for child welfare
and embracing a new human rights culture, post-World War II states initiated a slew of
reforms aimed at children in general as well as children-at-risk due to challenges posed
by their families or particular religious or cultural communities. In most Western
countries, humanitarian concerns, principles of compassion and benevolence, and the
sentimentalization of childhood provided the ethical motivation for the development of
modern institutions of child welfare.7 As Viviana Zelizer persuasively argues, American
culture

shifted—morally,

economically,

and

politically—to

view

children

as

economically ‘useless,’ but morally priceless.8 Children’s representation and participation

6

For specific treatment of the early history of child welfare in British Columbia, see Christopher Walmsley
and Diane Purvey, eds., Child and Family Welfare in British Columbia: A History (Calgary: Detselig
Enterprises, 2005). See also R. Brian Howe, “Implementing children’s rights in a federal state: The case of
Canada’s child protection system,” (2001) 9 International Journal of Children’s Rights 361 at 362-63.
7
For an overview of this history, see the “Introduction,” in Mona Gleason et al, eds., Lost Kids: Vulnerable
Children and Youth in Twentieth-Century Canada and the United States (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 112. For a similar history, but one that draws out the implications for the treatment of the child as a legal
subject, see Daiva Stasiulis, “The Active Child Citizen: Lessons from Canadian Policy and the Children’s
Movement,” (2002) 6:4 Citizenship Studies, 507-38.
8
Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children (New York: Basic
Books, 1985). Risks to children, historically minimized by adults, became a cause for collective concern
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in the justice system, however, did not shift as radically from the original common law
legal baseline where they were designated chattels or property. They remained
disadvantaged by adversarial legal processes premised on adult norms and persons that
did not treat them as full legal persons who could claim rights along with the fulfilment
of duties. Indeed, children were generally considered incompetent, incapacitated and
dependent.9

b.

The Unadulterated Adversarial Model: Lawyer Advocates

Lawyers traditionally acted on behalf of children when welfare, protection and family
cases entered the court system. For common law jurisdictions, the earliest model was a
court-appointed lawyer or guardian ad litem who represented a child in wardship,
guardianship, child protection, and access and custody cases. Studies from Australia,
New Zealand and the United States that have analyzed the effectiveness of lawyer
advocates in representing children convey enormous dissatisfaction with this model from
many participating actors.10 Systemic criticisms condemned how a common law system
treated children as passive and inferior legal subjects, and emphasized how lawyers failed
to listen properly to familial concerns, treat children with respect, and properly solicit
their views. The studies disclosed that lawyers often did not speak to or physically meet
with the children they were charged with representing. Moreover, though lawyers were
and a measure of the advancement of society in the American Progressive Era (roughly 1896 to 1920).
Zelizer discusses the broad cultural shift whereby adults expressed empathic commitments to children
though modern education, health, insurance, and labour policies and programs.
9
For a pithy summation of these problems, see J.M. Herlihy, “Dealing with Child Abuse: Adversarial
versus Investigative Systems,” (1992) 24:1 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 16-22. Herlihy focuses
on the historically recurring problems in child abuse cases in which children could be compelled to give
evidence. See also Alison Cleland, “Legal Solutions for Children: Comparing Scots Law with Other
Jurisdictions,” (1995) 10 Scottish Affairs, 6-14.
10
See Andy Bilson and Sue White, “Representing Children’s Views and Best Interests in Court: An
International Comparison,” (2005) 14 Child Abuse Review 220 at 230-31.
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considered generally effective advocates in courts, they were shown to lack the expertise
and focus that individuals solely devoted to considering children’s interests and
representing their wishes possess. In many cases, a clear tension existed between the role
of the lawyer who was simultaneously acting for the court while also serving children’s
interests. With busy practices and large caseloads, lawyer advocates often lacked the time
and energy to provide supports to children who experienced trauma and bewilderment in
the court system because they were placed in adversarial relations with family members
and/or governmental agencies. Studies measuring children’s satisfaction with models of
representation rank lawyer-only systems poorly.11 Failing to act comprehensively and
compassionately and playing only short-term, temporary roles in children’s lives, the
lawyer-advocate model was shown to fall quite short.12

The extension of legal rights to children and the statutory direction for legal actors to
consider the best interests of the child in decision have not constituted an adequate
remedy for the deficiencies of the adversarial model.13 One critic of the adversarial
system maintains that for the adversarial system to become more flexible and meet the
needs of children would “involve a change of such magnitude that it could weaken the
very fabric…”.14 A fundamental overhaul with the adversarial system appears to be a
non-starter, but the institutional consequence of this reality has been non-uniform
incremental attempts at reform across a number of jurisdictions. Adversarial legal
11

Ibid. at 235.
For further discussion on this point, please see the contribution to this volume by Jula Hughes which
examines the challenges for traumatized victims testifying in adversarial systems.
13
For a vigorous critique of how the best interests principle has been interpreted and applied by judges in
custody decision in the legal system, see Cindy L. Baldassi, Susan B. Boyd and Fiona Kelly, “Losing the
Child in Child-Centred Legal Processes,” in Lost Kids, supra note 7, 192-212.
14
Herlihy, supra note 9 at 18.
12

Mary Liston

Evolving Capacities: BCRCY as a Hybrid Model of Oversight

9

culture remains resistant to change and continues to permeate other models in
common law countries.15

c.

The Adulterated Adversarial Model: State and Volunteer Advocates

Generalized dissatisfaction with the adversarial system and lawyer-advocates produced a
slate of alternative models from the 1970s on and which modified the adversarial system
to make use of investigative methodology and more comprehensive approaches to
children’s cases. The challenging and multiple needs of children resulted in the creation
of expert bodies whose primary function was child advocacy or, alternatively, alternative
dispute resolution processes. The use of these bodies was, until recently, the orthodox
model in Canada and in other common law jurisdictions. Led by Ontario and Alberta,
child advocacy offices became a preferred reform choice in Canada.16 On the continuum
of models, the Office of the Child and Youth Advocate (OCYA) in Alberta hearkens
back to these early efforts to manage child welfare through an independent agency that
acts as a check and a balance on government decision-making affecting young people and
is primarily devoted to the amplification of child and youth voices, greater participation,
and championing for child and youth rights (see Tables 1 and 2).

15

In an early article, Carrie Menkel-Meadow analyzed the co-opting tendencies of adversarial lawyers—
their attitudes and practices—when participating in alternative dispute resolutions systems. See “Pursuing
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted, or ‘The Law of ADR,’” (1991) 19:1
Florida State University Law Review 1-46. In her contribution to this collection, Robin Creyke discusses
contemporary difficulties in shaking the adversarial culture within the context of hearings in Australian
administrative tribunals that have been statutorily designated as “inquisitorial”. See Robin Creyke,
“Pragmatism v. Policy: Attitude of Australian Courts and Tribunals to Inquisitorial Process”. In the
Canadian context, see British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General Justice Services Branch, “Legal
Culture,” 23 February 2005, 1-18. Available at: http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/justice-reforminitiatives/publications/pdf/LegalCulture.pdf.
16
Further information on Ontario’s history and new model can be found in Paul C. Whitehead, Nicholas
Bala et al., “A New Model for Child and Youth Advocacy in Ontario,” 2004 Report prepared for the
Ministry of Children and Youth Services. Available at:
http://provincialadvocate.on.ca/documents/en/Final_Report_Eng.pdf.
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The OCYA functions as a delegate of the provincial Ministry of Children and Youth
Services. The OCYA is accountable to and receives it funding from the Ministry and is
therefore neither stand-alone nor independent. Nevertheless, it is expert in its specialized
focus on children and youth. The OCYA’s core function remains traditional individual
advocacy for vulnerable children and the investigation of complaints from adults and
children regarding the provision of government services. It is one step removed from the
lawyer-advocate model as evidenced by its responsibility for appointing legal counsel
through its Legal Representation for Children and Youth services. It does not, unlike
similar bodies in other jurisdictions, investigate children’s deaths (See Table 2). The
OCYA also does not undertake systemic reform efforts, attesting again to its main role as
an internal advocacy system.17 The primary audience for the Alberta office, then, is the
Alberta provincial government.

A further step along the continuum brings us to the American model of citizen volunteers
as guardians ad litem (see Table 3). In this model, state agencies recruit, train, and
manage volunteer representatives from a variety of backgrounds—social workers,
lawyers, and ‘ordinary’ citizens—to act as court appointed special advocates.
Independent representation of abused and neglected children is their chief function, rather
than legal services, and the shift to trained citizen volunteers reduces costs, especially
when compared to the cost of using lawyer-advocates. Studies of citizen volunteers
conclude that this model excelled at providing effective and efficient representation,
17

Howe speculates that the OCYA differs from other models in Canada—indeed lags—because the more
conservative and libertarian political culture of Alberta places greater emphasis on the privacy and
autonomy of the family. Howe, supra note 6 at 362.
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especially when volunteers work in tandem with lawyers to effectuate the best interests of
vulnerable children.18 Nevertheless, this model is both resource intensive due to the
constant training of volunteers and exceptional in that perhaps no other country in the
world embraces a tradition of volunteerism (instead of relying on the state) as the United
States does. Finally, despite reliance on volunteer advocates in what appears to be a more
radical system, these child representatives are subject to pressures to professionalize in
order to best represent children’s interests.19 Voluntary citizen review boards and
volunteer citizen guardians depend on quality appointments, a requirement which means
that volunteers may have to undergo training in a variety of complex child development
and welfare areas, including legal, in order to make competent judgements about a child’s
best interests.

d.

Specialized and Hybrid Ombuds

Instead of the adulterated adversarial model, a different institutional remedy emerged as a
common form in Canada: the Ombudsman.20 The virtues of the Ombuds model in the
child welfare context are significant in contrast to the Alberta model discussed above:
greater independence and autonomy; greater accountability to the public due to the
connection with the provincial legislature; specialized focus on children and youth; and,
enhanced efforts at implementing policy recommendations and systemic reform.21 These

18

Bilson and White, supra note 10 at 229.
For a discussion of several of the strengths and weaknesses of citizen volunteers, see Mark Hardin, “A
Comparison of Administrative, Citizen and Judicial Review,” (1985) 7 Children and Youth Services
Review, 161-72.
20
Norway established the first Ombudsman for Children in 1981. For an overview of types of ombuds, see
Mary A. Marshall and Linda C. Reif, “The Ombudsman: Maladministration and Alternative Dispute
Resolution,” (1995) 34 Alberta Law Review, 215-39.
21
The provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick delegated responsibility for children and youth to
their Ombuds offices as part of their general mandate or, in some cases, as a specialized function. Nova
19
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bodies conform to the “classic” functions of an ombuds by resolution citizen-government
disputes through listening, investigating, weighing facts, and providing remedies to
resolve the dispute. But, they are also specialized ombuds with jurisdiction over a
particular policy area or subject matter. Lastly, those offices which are informed by rights
(e.g., civil and political, social cultural, human and collective) and international principles
as part of their mandate can be considered “hybrid” ombuds.22

Ten children’s advocacy offices currently exist in Canada, each defined by their
provincial enabling statutes (see Table 1).23 As can be seen in Table 1, all are
independent agencies, except for Alberta whose Office is contained within the Ministry
of Children and Youth Services, and can therefore decide matters with relative freedom
from the interference of influence of the executive branch of government. 24 The
hallmarks of independence vary but most of these offices have a significant degree of
independence from the Executive, are accountable to the provincial legislative assembly,
exercise considerable statutory powers under their enabling acts, have greater security of
tenure under their terms of office, operational autonomy, and more secure funding since
Scotia’s Office of the Ombudsman, for example, has a Youth and Senior Services Division. In 2011, New
Brunswick separated the Child and Youth Advocate from the Ombudsman; previously, they were merged
in one office. Saskatchewan, while using one statute to enable both the Ombuds and the Children’s
Advocate, nevertheless created a stand-alone Child’s Advocate Office.
22
Marshall and Reif, supra note 20 at 231-34. See also Linda C. Reif, “Building Democratic Institutions:
The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection,”
(2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1-69.
23
For further information on other provincial jurisdictions, see Robin MacLean and R. Brian Howe, “Brief
Report on Canadian provincial children and youth advocacy offices: Highlights of functions and recent
activities,” available on line at: http://www.cbu.ca/sites/cbu.ca/files/pdfs/crc-brief-report-canadianprovincial-children-youth-advocacy-offices.pdf. Many people in the territory of Nunavut would also like to
see an independent Child’s Advocate established. See “Nunavut child’s advocate needs autonomy:
minister” at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2009/08/21/nunavut-child-advocate.html.
24
In this section I rely on Laverne Jacobs’ concise overview of the concept of independence of
administrative agencies in Canadian public law. See “Independence, Impartiality and Bias” in Colleen
Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context: A New Casebook (Toronto: EmondMontgomery, 2008), 139-66.
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their monies come from their provincial legislatures and not the executive branch. Most
are stand-alone agencies focussing on a single policy area created through a special
statute, and are primarily devoted to child welfare. All of these offices hear complaints or
issues raised by children, youth, or adults on behalf of children and youth and are charged
with investigative powers that can be used to engage in individual and systemic
advocacy. Individual advocacy in response to complaints or concerns remains a core
function. All offices respond to the voice of children, but some are more active in seeking
and engaging children’s voices. Most of the offices recommend policy changes to
governments and engage in broad publicity and education efforts.

Québec offers another variation on the ombuds model. Its Commission des droits de la
personne et des droits de la jeunesse is a specialized administrative agency which also
houses a tribunal and is governed by a provincial Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The
Commission acts like a conventional human rights agency, but with a specialized child
and youth division. Similar to the Ombuds model, the Commission reports to the
provincial legislature. However, it also shares with Alberta a lack of independence in that
it receives its funding from the provincial Ministry of Justice and is therefore subject to
greater ministerial influence and control.

Each of these types of ombuds approximates an inquisitorial model that enquires into
truth by engagement in a greater responsibility for fact and policy gathering, possesses
broad recommendatory powers, and shifts various burdens and responsibilities from the
parties or the lawyer-advocate to the relevant independent authority. And, though each
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provincial body differs in scope and mandate, the institutional landscape is becoming less
of a patchwork with Alberta standing as a clear outlier.

III.

The Hybrid Model: B.C.’s Representative for Children and Youth

This section will first briefly set out the most recent history leading to the creation of the
RCYBC—a history that includes the shift from traditional adversarial processes, two
public inquiries, a conventional child and youth advocate, a children’s commission, and
an internal officer within the home ministry.25 I will then analyze the structure and
functions of the RCYBC in terms of innovative institutional design. Lastly, the section
considers some challenges and problems that have arisen for this new model.

a.

The Birth of a New Model26

The creation of the first Child, Youth, and Family Advocate in 1995 resulted from a
several key political moments within a lengthy period of institutional turmoil and
political acrimony. First, the 1980s saw substantive change in the delivery of child
services with the enactment of the first piece of child protection legislation since 193927
combined with deep budget cuts and reorganization of the government office devoted to

25

For a thorough presentation of the historical context, see Michele McBride, “Report on Child Advocacy
and Complaint Resolution Process,” Victoria, B.C.: Children and Youth Review, 2006.
26
Consistent with the genealogy set out at the beginning of this chapter, children protection in B.C. began
with the guardianship model for orphaned or neglected children as wards of the state and delivered through
children’s aid societies (the Infants Act, 1901). This was replaced by a model of social and child protection
services (the Protection of Children Act, 1939) which then changed to a system of regional and community
service delivery (Community Resources Board Act, 1974). Prior to the reforms which are the focus of this
chapter, it morphed into an integrated system of social services, though one which was criticized for failing
to recognize children’s rights and for not providing a child advocate role. (the Family and Child Service
Act, 1981). McBride, supra note 25 at 5.
27
The Family Child Service Act (1981) was enacted in response to the Royal Commission on Family and
Children’s Law (1974-75), but failed to incorporate many of the important recommendations of that the
Commission made.
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delivering child welfare programs.28 Economic and political turbulence resulted in a
change of government in 1991 from the conservative Social Credit Party to the
democratic socialist New Democratic Party. The NDP government vowed to reform the
delivery of child welfare and protection services. They engaged in a broad public
consultation exercise which resulted in the issue of two reports by the Ministry of Social
Services, the first focusing on the views from non-Aboriginal communities regarding
child welfare reform29 and the second focusing on Aboriginal communities in B.C30.
Shortly after the second report, the province was rocked by the neglect, abuse and death
of 5-year-old Matthew Vaudreuil in 1992 at the hands of his mother, with the media
bolstering outrage by providing detailed reports on how the existing child protection
services had mishandled his case. In response to these reports, the Minister of Social
Services delivered new legislation—the Child, Family and Community Services Act
(“CFCSA”)—which promised a value shift in service delivery based on a model of least
intrusion to families.31 Though the provincial legislature passed the CFCSA in 1994, it
did not come into force until 1996 in order to allow time for the development of new
policies and procedures. The provincial government also created a public inquiry in 1994,
charged with examining the circumstances leading to Matthew’s 1992 death, with the aim
of restoring public confidence in the child protection system. This became known as the
Gove Inquiry headed by Mr. Justice Thomas Gove, a provincial court judge.32

28

From 1983 to 1988, child protection services faced substantial reductions in the staff, contracting out,
and a reorganization that removed a variety of services from the single office—then the Ministry of Social
Services—to separate offices managing different aspects of child welfare and protection.
29
“Making Changes: A Place to Start,” Victoria, B.C.: Ministry of Social Services, 1992.
30
“Liberating Our Children, Liberating Our Nations,” Victoria, B.C.: Ministry of Social Services, 1992.
31
RSBC 1996, c 46.
32
British Columbia, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Gove Inquiry into Child Protection in
British Columbia, 3 vols., Victoria, B.C.: Queen’s Printer for British Columbia, 1995.
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After eighteen months of investigation and research, Mr. Justice Gove issued his report in
1995 recommending changes to B.C.’s child protection system as well as the creation of
several new institutions: a new Ministry of Children and Family Development which
consolidated several existing but then separate services under one institutional umbrella;
the first Child, Youth and Family Advocate who would provide services for children and
families having difficulties with the new ministry; and, a Children’s Commission to
review child deaths and to provide oversight of the new ministry. The overall policy
direction shifted toward removing children from their homes instead of providing
assistance to stay together—a major break from the family preservation model that had
inspired the CFCSA. In institutional terms, then, B.C. moved away from the familycentred model that was commonly employed in Europe and which was premised on
providing substantial resources for family support.33 The CFCSA came into force after
the Gove Report, but it was accompanied by new regulation and practices that reflected
the move away from the family support model, resulting in an increase in the number of
children in government care.34 At the same time, the community-based providers such as
women’s centres faced government cuts or closure, making the situation worse for those
children in care.

This institutional architecture operated until 2001 when a new Liberal government looked
at the various agencies involved in child protection as part of a Core Services Review. In
addition to the three agencies created in 1995 and discussed above, the Coroners Service,
33

Howe, supra note 6 at 371.
From 1979 to 1993, the number of children in care decreased from 9,000 to approximately 6,000 but
from 1994 to 1999 the numbers increased from 6,000 to 10,000. See Darcie Bennett and Lobat
Sadrehashemi, “Broken Promises: Parents Speak about B.C.’s Child Welfare System,” (Vancouver, B.C.:
Pivot Legal Society, 2008), 16-17.
34
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provincial Ombudsman, and Public Guardian and Trustee also provided child-related
services. In order to trim expenses and cut duplication, the government rationalized
services by creating a new Child and Youth Officer who would replace both the
Advocate and the Commissioner and act as the main oversight body. The Coroner would
take on a new child death review function (one more limited than the Children’s
Commission), while the Ombudsman would continue to monitor general fairness issues.
At the same time, the government engaged in large-scale budget cuts as well as a shift
towards regional provision of services in anticipation of a devolved regional governance
model.

But in 2004, individuals in the child protection system turned to the former Ombudsman,
the former Advocate for Children, Youth and Families, and the former Children’s
Commissioner to ask them to communicate widespread concerns to the Premier about the
impact of budget cuts on vulnerable children and the lack of accountability in the
Ministry. After a letter from the three former public officials to the Premier elicited no
response, they released their letter to the public in 2005. Very shortly after this letter
garnered significant publicity, two Aboriginal infants in the foster care program managed
by the Ministry died and their deaths became linked with the issues raised in the letter.35
Public and media scrutiny resulted in the disclosure that no internal reviews of earlier
suspicious child deaths and the two current deaths had occurred. The new Coroner’s

35

In 2005 Sherry Charlie, a 19-month-old Aboriginal girl placed in a kinship care agreement, was
murdered while in the care of her uncle. In 2002, Chasidy Whitford, who was 2, was murdered by her
father while the family was receiving child protection services. In both cases, the Liberal government was
accused of sacrificing children to cost-saving because children placed in these type of kinship arrangements
were not counted as ‘children in care’ and therefore their family providers received less government
support compared to regular foster care providers.
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Service did not provide the same intensive death reviews as had the earlier Children’s
Commission and the Ministry itself did not release several internal reviews of the
problems to the public. These failings of accountability and transparency, as well as the
resulting public opprobrium, compelled the Minister of Children and Family
Development to appoint the Honourable Ted Hughes, a retired judge, to engage in an
independent review of the child protection system in 2005: the Hughes Inquiry.

The Hughes Inquiry examined advocacy for children and youth, oversight of the
government’s performance in protecting and providing services in B.C., and the systems
for reporting and review of child deaths and how much they furthered public
accountability. At the time of the Hughes Inquiry, the Ministry had gone through nine
ministers in ten years, including eight deputy ministers and seven directors of child
welfare. The Ministry, Hughes concluded, had implemented a policy shift to keep
children at home, but without the social supports and staff training due to budget cuts.36
At the same time, the provincial government pulled back some functions to the centre
from the regions while concurrently preparing the ground for the eventual devolution of
child welfare services to the control of Aboriginal authorities. As Justice Hughes wrote,
each of these changes on its own posed formidable challenges, but together they “created

36

Judge Hughes noted that this shift undid the earlier Gove-initiated policy direction, concluding that the
earlier shift was misguided but had its basis partly in social workers’ fears that they would be held
responsible for children left in homes where they might be harmed. Indeed, a notorious case in Ontario
involving the starvation death of an infant—Jordan Heikamp—resulted in a social worker being charged
with criminal negligence for failing to intervene and protect him from his mother. The new policy direction
prioritized child protection over family preservation.
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a climate of instability and confusion” which ultimately frustrated the ability of the
Ministry to protect vulnerable children and support families in crisis and need.37

After four and a half months of research, public consultation, file review and data
gathering, Justice Hughes submitted his final report in April 2006. The report contained
the results of his review and set of 62 recommendations to improve child protection and
child welfare in British Columbia. One of his key recommendations was the creation of a
new, independent body to oversee the child welfare system: the Representative for
Children and Youth.

b.

Family Resemblances

By implementing a largely ombuds institutional model that kept some features of the
adversarial system in the context of the oversight of child protection and welfare services,
British Columbia proved to be an early provincial innovator.38 The Representative for
Children and Youth Act, enacted in May 2006, quickly followed on the heels of the
Hughes Report.39 As Table 1 shows, the RCY is a legislative officer, has the powers of a
commissioner of inquiry, retains many of the functions of an Ombuds, and possesses the
structural independence of a provincial auditor general.

37

E.N. Hughes, “BC Children and Youth Review: An Independent Review of BC’s Child Protection
System. 7 April 2006 at 4. Available at:
http://www.mcf.gov.bc.ca/bcchildprotection/pdf/BC_Children_and_Youth_Review_Report_FINAL_April
_4.pdf.
38
The model for the RCY was influenced by concurrent developments in Ontario which resulted in the
Office of the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth (see Table 1)
39
Representative for Children and Youth Act, S.B.C. 2006, c.29 [RCYA]. Though passed in May 2006, the
Act itself came into force over three phases: 1) the enabling of administrative functions in November 2006;
2) the enabling of the advocacy and monitoring functions in March 2007; and 3) the enabling of the critical
injury and death review and investigative functions.
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As an officer of the provincial legislature, the RCY must provide annual reports to the
legislature via the Select Standing Committee on Children and Youth and it receives its
funding from the legislative assembly.40 To be appointed, the RCY must receive
unanimously recommendation by a special committee of the legislative committee and
then approval by resolution in the legislative assembly.41 The term of office is for five
years and is renewable for a second-five year term only.42 It requires a 2/3 or more vote
in the legislature to remove the RCY for cause or incapacity, though he or she may also
be suspended from office with or without salary according to the same terms.43

The office of the RCY has an almost $7 million annual budget which goes some distance
to funding both investigative and consultative efforts. Table 1 shows that British
Columbia, Alberta and Ontario are consistently the highest spenders on child welfare
services. Manitoba, on the other hand, is the highest spender per capita on child welfare
services from 1992-1999.44 Despite provincial fiscal restraints and federal reductions in
transfers to the provinces, child protection and family services have seen increases and
appear, for the moment, to attract relatively constant governmental support.45

40

RCYA, s.17(1).
RCYA, s.2(1).
42
RCYA, s.2(3) and (4).
43
RCYA, s. 4(2).
44
Howe, supra note 6 at 374. Despite its different model, one that is about limited intervention and not
about family services and children’s’ rights, Alberta provides the most funds.
45
Nevertheless, the RCY has criticized the Ministry of Children and Family Development for failing, after
five years, to implement more than half of Justice Hughes’ 62 recommendations. See “Missed
Opportunities in Progress on Hughes Recommendations: A Symptom of Bigger Ministry Problems,” 29
November 2010. Available at:
http://www.rcybc.ca/Images/PDFs/News%20Releases/Hughes%20Rpt%20NR%20Final%20.pdf.
41
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Consistent with the investigative model, the Act permits the RCY to establish
multidisciplinary teams in order to assist with reviews and investigations in child deaths
and critical injuries.46 These reviews and investigations do not replace parallel criminal
investigations, and the RCY must wait until the completion of a criminal or other
investigation by a public body.47 Failure of persons to answer questions or cooperate may
result in the RCY applying to the B.C. Supreme Court for an order to comply and, if noncooperation continues, the RCY can initiate contempt proceedings in court.48

Other features of the RCY clearly parallel the practical problem-solving and investigatory
role of an Ombuds who can choose to act formally or informally, flexibly and efficiently.
The RCY is charged with engaging in systemic and policy advocacy49 and embraces
stakeholder and public outreach as well as public education about children’s rights and
government and parental duties. Since the statutory definition of “child” is a person under
19 years of age, the scope of the RCY’s child stakeholder concerns is quite broad.50
Notably, in addition to the monitoring, reviewing, and auditing functions, the RCY is
empowered to engage in significant research efforts.

The RCY possesses the discretionary initiative to investigate matters of import and can
then submit Special Reports to the legislative assembly containing policy
recommendations and information about governmental compliance with previous
46

RCYA, s.15.
RCYA, s.13. Or, in some cases, until one year after the critical injury or death of the child—whichever
comes earlier.
48
RCYA, s.14 and 14.1.
49
RCYA, s.6.
50
RCYA, s.1. “Youth” has a more limited definition: a person who between the above the age of 16 but
under 19.
47
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recommendations. The Speaker must lay these reports before the assembly and the
standing committee as soon as possible.51 These investigations, however, are not solely
directed at uncovering the ‘truth’ underlying individual cases, but try to ascertain the
causes of systemic failures and then recommend measures that will successfully prevent
children’s critical injuries and deaths in the future. This statutory intention expresses an
aim to overcome the fragmentation of information and dispersal of responsibility in
various organizations thus ensuring greater accountability. The underlying ethos is one
directed towards problem solving, is not confrontational but consultative, and
incorporates elements of restorative justice over forms of retributive justice.

Though it does have a clear advocacy role, RCY does not engage in formal advocacy in
courts or before tribunals, thereby eliminating the earlier lawyerly forms of advocacy.
The RCY has no statutory power to act as legal counsel. 52 So, while the RCY is not
adversarial in the sense of providing or acting as legal counsel, the RCY does serve a
more adversarial and confrontational function in the investigation review of children’s
critical injuries and deaths—a responsibility carried over from the earlier provincial
model and one which operates in tandem with the Coroner’s Office. Moreover, the RCY
is tasked with preserving the individual autonomy of children in relation to family and
state intrusion or control as legal counsel might do in dispute resolution processes. But
the underlying child-centred approach focuses more on facilitating intervention than
finding fault. A key function is the ensure that children no longer feel underrepresented,

51

RCYA, s.20.
RCYA, s.9. Nevertheless, the RCY also does have subpoena powers such as those possessed by child
advocates in Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan and the Yukon.
52
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lack voice, and are disadvantaged by information asymmetries which adult decisionmakers control and benefit from.

The appointment of Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond as the first RCY also indirectly
incorporates aspects of the adversarial system. Turpel-Lafond is a lawyer, a legal
academic, and is currently on leave from the Saskatchewan Provincial Court where she is
a judge, having been appointed in 1998. She has also worked as a criminal law judge in
youth and adult court. She has a lengthy history of involvement in projects relating to
access to justice, judicial independence, sexually exploited children and youth, and
children and youth with disabilities including those who suffer from foetal alcohol
disorder. It has long been noted that in the Canadian public law order, inquisitorial
initiatives such as commissions and public inquiries are often headed by retired or acting
judges.53 While not adversarial on the surface the, the role morality and rights advocacy
endemic to the common law adversarial system is blended with the inquisitorial model
through the appointments process. Such a blending, however, is clearly contingent on the
types of persons who are selected for the position as an ongoing commitment, and future
RCYs may not always have this legal background.

Close to half of the children in care in B.C. are Aboriginal, with a similar pattern existing
across the country. In provinces with significant Aboriginal populations—including
B.C.—children’s representatives also incorporate a particularized focus on the
circumstances of Aboriginal children. The selection of Turpel-Lafond illustrates this
53

For an excellent overview of public inquiries in Canada, see Peter Carver, “Getting the Story Out:
Accountability and the Law of Public Inquiries,” in Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative
Law in Context: A New Casebook (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 2008), 359-89.
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point well since she is an active member of the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation in
Saskatchewan.54 Her early life mirrors the experience of many of the children she
represents—growing up in a poor home that was also afflicted by alcoholism and
violence. Her background significantly underscores the policy shift that the RCY as in
institution represents: the principle of family autonomy no longer is balanced equally
against the best interests of the child. This policy shift is most clearly recognized in
British Columbia, Ontario and New Brunswick.55 Each of these jurisdictions engaged in
major reform after the tragic deaths of Aboriginal children. In jurisdictions with
substantial Aboriginal populations, the best interests of the child will likely be balanced
with the principle of respecting different cultural and local community practices. In B.C.,
the “best interests” framework—understood as either a legal principle or a legal test—
was subject to major debate over whether it was culturally and class specific, and
therefore would be inappropriately applied to Aboriginal families. The outcome of these
debates resulted in a modified best interests principle.56

The last notable feature of the RCY attests to the role of the office in furthering
democratic and rule of law objectives. The enabling statute contains a powerful provision
guaranteeing a ‘right to information’. This right, which will be discussed in more detail in
54

She published a book on the history of the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation that was short-listed for a 2005
Saskatchewan Book Award. Turpel-Lafond says that she wrote the book for her children. See Mary Ellen
Tupel-Lafond, Maskeko-sakahikanihk: 100 years for a Saskatchewan First Nation (Saskatoon: HoughtonBoston, 2005).
55
For an example of this shift in the weight given to governing principles, see New Brunswick’s Family
Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2.
56
See, for example, s.52 of the Law and Equity Act, RSBC 1996, c 253: “52(1) In proceedings involving
the guardianship, custody, access to or maintenance of a child the court must consider the best interests of
the child. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in proceedings under the Child, Family and Community Service
Act except as provided in that Act.” The CFCSA explicitly requires the preservation of an Aboriginal
child’s cultural identity to be part of the determination of best interests by a director of adoption or a
provincial court.
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the following subsection, gives the RCY the power to access any information in the
control of a public body (other than an officer of the legislature) or director that the RCY
herself deems necessary to exercise his or her statutory powers, functions and duties.57
Importantly, the public body or director must disclose this information despite
confidentiality or privilege claims (other than solicitor-client privilege).58

Turpel-Lafond has used her statutory powers and mandate effectively. Her earlier calls
for the reinstatement of the position of director for child welfare met with success in
2011.59 This position was axed in 2008, but Turpel-Lafond called for a new director after
her January 2011 inquiry into the death of 21 infants in B.C. in order to provide more
accountability into infant deaths and ensure that standards in child welfare practices are
complied with. In October 2011, a special committee of the legislative assembly was
struck to consider the re-appointment of Turpel-Lafond to her second term as required by
section 2 of the RCYA. This special committee unanimously recommended her
reappointment, which took effect in November 2011.60

c.

Challenges to independence and judicial review’s protective potential

As we have seen, the BCRCY combines several functions: high-level advocacy on behalf
of children, youth and their families; sophisticated policy development and systemic
advocacy; review and investigation of deaths and critical injuries of children and youth
57

RCYA, s.10(2).
RCYA, s.10(3) and (4). The RCYA is also subject to s.51 of the provincial Evidence Act relating to
restrictions with respect to health care evidence.
59
See “B.C. appoints child welfare director at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/britishcolumbia/story/2011/03/31/bc-child-welfare-hughes.html.
60
For the official press release, see: http://www.leg.bc.ca/cmt/39thparl/session4/rfcay/media/mediaReleases/HTML/Rel-RFCAY-39-4BCRepForChildrenAndYouthReappointedForSecondTerm-2011-NOV-15.htm.
58
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receiving government services; and, auditing, monitoring, and reporting. Not only does
the RCY represent a polyjural model of decision-making, it also serves a
multidisciplinary coordination function across government departments. Lastly, it
promotes open government and public accountability in a collaborative manner with
other public bodies.

Challenges to the independence of the RCY take many forms, some obvious while others
are more novel. Independent public institutions generally face threats to their
independence in three ways: statutory reforms to reduce jurisdiction and powers;
executive control of the appointments process; and budget cuts. Though financial support
appears steady in B.C., economic downturns can easily result in substantial cuts to even
well-regarded bodies.61 And, as explained above, although the appointments process for
the RCY is more rigorous and constrained than conventional processes of appointment in
the administrative state through the use of executive discretion, the integrity of a public
body significantly depends on the quality of the persons leading and staffing it.

Lastly, the RCY has faced a recent challenge to its powers and structural independence
through an attempt at legislative reform. In April 2010, the provincial Liberal government
under then Premier Gordon Campbell introduced legislation specifically aimed at not
only restricting the ability of the RCY to access cabinet documents, but doing so

61

In 2007, the RCY won the public battle to have her budget increased by an all-party finance committee:
“Children's watchdog gets full budget hike,” 15 December 2007, Globe and Mail:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/childrens-watchdog-gets-full-budget-hike/article137538/.
Many motivated stakeholder groups in B.C. are committed to scrutinizing the provincial government in
order to ensure optimal interaction with the RCY.
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retroactively.62 The government asserted cabinet privilege protected this information
while Turpel-Lafond countered that “It’s very important in my role to have a look at the
system behind the curtain, if you like, and then very carefully report to the public to say,
‘Here’s an issue, here’s what happened, here are some reasonable suggestions for
improvement in the future.’…I’m in a pickle.”63 She maintained that she had access to
cabinet documents in the past and that she, as a judge, was well aware of her duties not to
violate privacy issues or disclose sensitive information to the public. The proposed bill
was included in a miscellaneous package of unrelated legislation, leading to charges that
the government was attempting reform by stealth tactics.

The RCY challenged the Office of the Premier and the Ministry of Children and Family
Development (MCFD) in court seeking to enforce her right to information and disclosure
of documents she needed in the course of her formal audit of the then “Child in the Home
62

Bill-20—2010: Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 3), 2010, c.21. Section 36 originally
provided that:
Section 10 of the Representative for Children and Youth Act, S.B.C. 2006, c. 29, is amended
(a) by repealing subsection (1) and substituting the following:
(1) In this section:
“committee” includes a committee designated under section 12 (5) of the Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act;
“officer of the Legislature” has the same meaning as in the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, but does not include the representative, and
(b) by adding the following subsection:
(2.1) Subsection (2) does not apply with respect to information that would reveal the substance of
deliberations of the Executive Council or any of its committees, including any advice,
recommendations, policy considerations or draft legislation or regulations submitted or prepared for
submission to the Executive Council or any of its committees.
63

“New legislation will ‘cripple’ B.C.’s Representative,” 30 April 2010, Globe and Mail:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/british-columbia/new-legislation-will-cripple-bcschildrens-representative/article1553245/. Of the approximately 4500 children in the program at the time,
almost 50 per cent were Aboriginal.
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of a Relative” Program.64 The B.C. Supreme Court found that the legislature did not
intend that the s.20 legislative remedy contained in the RCYA should preclude the RCY’s
access to court in order to obtain a remedy for statutory breaches of s.10. In her
judgment, Madame Justice Griffon suggested that the envisioned legislative remedy
would be a report from the RCY containing a complaint that the Speaker would present
to the legislative assembly and the assembly could compel persons to appear before it
with the required documents. She further noted that this function—including determining
solicitor-client privilege—normally lies outside the purview of a legislature and, because
of this, might prove inadequate or ineffective. Citing the principle of the rule of law as a
legal constraint on arbitrary state action, Madame Justice Griffin declared:
“The rule of law is a fundamental premise of our legal and democratic
system. It means that no one is immune from law or excluded from the
benefit of the law. For this reason, the notion that anyone, especially
persons holding high public office, can breach their statutory duties
without being accountable to a court of law is a highly exceptional
proposition.”65
She observed that the only documents specifically excluded from the duty to disclose in
the statute are those covered by solicitor-client, not Cabinet privilege and that this could
not have been a legislative oversight.66 Lastly, if executive actors were concerned about
the potential use of the documents by the RCY as they claimed, they too could seek either
the prerogative remedy of prohibition in court which would constrain the RCY’s conduct

64

Representative for Children and Youth v. British Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2010
BCSC 697.
65
Ibid. at para. 74.
66
Ibid. at paras. 91-92.
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to her statutory confines, or a declaration clarifying the meaning of the confidentiality
provisions in the RCYA that would relate to the information the government was obliged
to produce. Justice Griffin concluded that the RCY had a right to the information, that the
MCFD and the Office of the Premier breached their statutory duty, and therefore the
RCY was entitled to the remedy of mandamus ordering the production of the documents.
Justice Griffin articulated in her judgment what Justice Hughes initially argued in his
report: that the goal of the RCY is to restore public confidence, depoliticize child welfare
issues, and provide a strong system of accountability. The right to information supported
these goals.

This year, the RCY and the MCFD signed an Advocacy Protocol aiming to, among many
items, clarify their roles, commit to coordination and reciprocal respect, remove barriers
to the RCY’s functioning, and re-affirm the RCY’s right to information in a timely
manner.67 Though the protocol provides another confirmation of how dynamic this model
of accountability has become, it also serves as a reminder of executive efforts to remove a
powerful public law right. The next stage of development will be the mandatory five-year
comprehensive review under section 30 of the RCYA which requires the Select Standing
Committee on Children and Youth to determine, among other statutory matters, whether
the Representative’s functions as described in section 6, are still required. The review
will be completed in 2012.

67

“Advocacy Protocol between the Ministry of Children and Family Development and the Representative
of Children and Youth,” 4 April 2011. Available at:
http://www.mcf.gov.bc.ca/child_protection/pdf/rcy_advocacy_protocol.pdf.
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Bodies such as the RCY are vulnerable to reform efforts when majority governments
disagree with actions and criticisms and can put their displeasure into legislative effect.
When this happens, the RCY’s case stands as an example of how the adversarial legal
system has the potential to protect a vulnerable investigative body. A broader institutional
perspective affirms the complementary role that adversarial courts can play though
judicial review, by acting as a necessary check on executive power and providing
essential support for democratic and rule of law forms of accountability.

V.

‘The Child is father of the Man’: International Kinship68

While a full examination is not possible in the confines of this paper, I wish to highlight
two salient comparative issues: 1) the problems that federal jurisdictions pose for creating
a RCY at the national level across different countries; and, 2) the increase in the influence
and permeability of international norms in domestic legal orders.

a.

The Problem with Federalism

When levels of government are competitive and non-cooperative, federal systems
undoubtedly complicate the implementation of children’s’ rights. They can, due to lack of
intergovernmental consultation and coordination, create a patchwork leading to the
arbitrary treatment of children across a national polity. 69 Federal jurisdictions such as
Australia and Canada do not have a Child’s Representative at the national level.70
68

From William Wordsworth, “My heart leaps up when I behold” which is the epigraph to Ode: Intimation
of Immortality.
69
See R. Brian Howe on the difficulties of implementing children’s rights in a federal state such as
Canada’s where child protection, and other constitutional heads of power, rest with the provinces. Supra
note 6.
70
In Canada, the federal government is responsible for child-related areas such as immigration and
refugees, Aboriginal families and children, divorce and custody, and criminal justice. Canadian federalism
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Australia, like Canada, has either a Commissioner or a Guardian in every State and
Territory who represents children and youth though each of their roles differs according
to their enabling legislation.

71

No federal representative yet exists, but the Australian

Human Rights Commission has created a discussion paper proposing a national Child’s
Commissioner72.

By way of contrast, the United States government created a comprehensive federal
agency devoted to children’s rights—the Children’s Bureau—in 1912. It lasted until the
1940s when the Truman Administration reorganized aspects of the federal system and the
Children’s Bureau lost most of its regulatory authority to larger agencies, becoming a
small office limited to investigation and reporting.73 The complexities of federal-state
relations in U.S. constitutionalism ensure that a national function will be very difficult to
re-create due to disagreements about the proper extent of state or federal authority over
family law.74

In 2003, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that Canada
establish an Ombudsman’s office at the federal level that would be responsible for

is highly decentralized due to, a large extent, the constitutional demands of Quebec in the Canadian
federation.
71
For more information on the role of Australian Commissioners for Children and Child Guardians, see
Appendix E of the House Standing Committee on Education and Training Report on combining school and
work: supporting successful youth transitions,” 16 November 2009. Available at:
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/edt/schoolandwork/report.htm.
72
The 2010 discussion paper is available at:
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/children/2010_commissioner_children.html.
73
For more on this history, see Kriste Lindenmeyer, A Right to Childhood: The U.S. Children's Bureau and
Child Welfare, 1912-1946 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997).
74
See Anne C. Dailey, “Federalism and Families,” (1995) 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
1787-1888 and also Ann Laquer Estin, “Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States,”
(2009) 18 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=113140.
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children’s rights.75 In June 2009, Liberal MP Marc Garneau initiated a private member’s
bill to establish a Child’s Commissioner of Canada.76 The Child’s Commissioner would
facilitate the promotion and implementation of the Convention as well as any
recommendations from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s review of
Canadian practices. Due to the instability of current Canadian politics, this bill only made
it through first reading and it is too soon after the 2011 election to know if the current
government will resurrect this proposal.

b.

International Relations

The last twenty years have seen substantial changes regarding the strength of children’s
rights—Western societies exhibit far less ambivalence about their importance—and the
influence of the CRC domestically. Situating the RCY in the international landscape (see
Table 3), we can see the growing right of children to participate in formal decisionmaking, to be listened to, and to be heard in various proceedings that affect their lives.
Many jurisdictions clearly refer to the CRC in enabling legislation or incorporate
particular principles to guide judicial interpretation, inform general standards and soft
law, and constrain administrative action in order to conform to international norms. Even
without incorporation in dualist legal systems, increased porosity is evident.77 In monist
jurisdictions, the CRC clearly has direct influence. The prevailing ethos is child-centred

75

Available at:
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/995a15056ca61d16c1256df0003
10995/$FILE/G0344648.pdf.
76
Bill C-418, An Act to establish a Children’s Commissioner of Canada. Available at:
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Bill=C418&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&V
iew=1.
77
For an early argument on the permeability of international norms in domestic law, see Stephen J. Toope,
“The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Implications for Canada”, in M. Freeman (ed.), Children’s
Rights: A Comparative Perspective (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996).
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and child-inclusive with an emphasis on participatory rights that embody substantive
guarantees of procedural fairness and recognize the equal moral status of children.

Table 3 confirms that the general trend in Western countries regarding the most effective
institutional model has been to create independent and stand-alone bodies with a
specialized focus on children. Systemic reform in Canada includes the recent
strengthening of functions and independence of offices in Ontario and British Columbia
by decoupling child advocacy from Ombuds functions. Since the 1990s, states and
territories in Australia have created children’s commissioners. New Zealand created its
Children’s Commissioner in 2003. Lastly, Europe has seen the expansion of children’s
ombuds since Norway created the first Ombudsman for Children in 1981 with the United
Kingdom providing some of the latest developments.78

It is not hard to conclude that the elevation of children’s moral worth has had a
concomitant bolstering of the powers of public bodies charged with taking their views,
rights and interests into account and facilitating their voice and will. The value shift in
cultural norms influences the representational and advocacy capacities of these
institutions that must embody this new perspective. As Daiva Stasiulis argues, “Rather
than view children as ‘pre-citizens’, or as silent, invisible, passive objects of parental
and/or state control…children are cast as full human beings, invested with agency,
78

For a list of members of the European Network of Ombudspersons for Children, see
http://www.crin.org/enoc/members/index.asp. The European Network of Ombudspersons for Children
(ENOC) is a not-for-profit association of independent children’s rights institutions, established in Norway
in 1997. Latin American also has many Ombuds with children’s rights units or staff dedicated to defending
children’s rights. For an earlier comprehensive overview of international developments, see Linda C. Reif,
“The Ombudsman for Children: Human Rights Protection and Promotion,” in The Ombudsman, Good
Governance and the International Human Rights System (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).
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integrity and decision-making capacities.”79 Guarantees of procedure fairness like those
found in Articles 3 and 12 of the CRC give real effect to the substantive moral
commitments confirming the dignity of child citizens.

Nevertheless, an eye to historical development and recent innovation serves to remind
that procedures, representation, and decision-making frameworks can, inadvertently and
when badly designed, make the vulnerable even more vulnerable. Though I have argued
that a hybrid model such as the RCY is a positive development, it is also a vulnerable
body in its own way. This case study therefore poses the recurring question of whose
interests are being served at what costs regardless of the label or model chosen.

79

Stasiulis, “supra note 7 at 508-09.
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Comparison across Canada: Structure
British Columbia

Alberta

Saskatchewan

Manitoba

Ontario

Quebec

Representative for
Children and
Youth

Office of the Child
and Youth
Advocate

Child’s
Advocate Office

Office of the
Children’s
Advocate

Enabling Act

Representative
for Children &
Youth Act (2006)

Child, Youth &
Family Enhancement Act (2000)
Protection of
Sexually Exploited
Children Act
(2000)

Ombudsman &
Children’s
Advocate Act
(1978)

Child &
Family
Services Act
(2003)
Adoption Act
(2003)

Standalone




Ministry of Children
and Youth Services





Office of the
Provincial
Advocate for
Children and
Youth
Provincial
Advocate for
Children &
Youth Act
(2007)
Child & Family
Services Act
(1990)


Commission des
droits de la
personne et des
droits de la
jeunesse
Quebec
Charter of
Rights &
Freedoms
(1975)
Youth
Protection Act
(1977)

Child and youth
division

Independent
Terms of
Office


5 years
Renewable for
2nd 5-year term


5 year nonrenewable term


Select Standing
Committee on
Children & Youth



Ministry of Children
and Youth Services


3 years
Renewable
for 2nd 3year term

Directly


5 years
Renewable for
2nd 5-year
term

Directly


----

Accountable
to Legislative
Assembly


5 years
Renewable for
2nd 5-year
term

Directly






2009-10 =
$1,621,000


2009-10 =
$2,384,000


2009-10 =
$6,100,000


Name

Funding from
Legislative
Assembly
Recent
budget
Specialized
or exclusive
focus on
youth &
children

2009-10 =
$6,991,519



Ministry of Children
and Youth Services
2009-10 =
$7,233,000


Newfoundland
& Labrador
Office of the
Child and Youth
Advocate

Office of the
Child and Youth
Advocate

Ombudsman
Act (1989)

Child & Youth
Advocate Act
(2002)

Child & Youth
Advocate Act
(2010)


Decoupled from
Ombudsman’s
Office in 2011

Between 5 and
10 years
Non-renewable


Youth and
Senior Services
Division

5 years
Renewable
(unspecified)






Commission
reports directly


Directly


Through the
Ombudsman


6 years
Renewable for
2nd 6-year
term

Directly


5 years
Renewable for
2nd 5-year
term

Directly


Ministry of
Justice
----









2009-10 =
$1,679,000


2009-10 =
$1,658,000


2008-09 =
$983,400


2009-10 = est.
$432,000




New
Brunswick
New Brunswick
Child and Youth
Advocate

Nova Scotia

Child & Youth
Advocate Act
(2007)

Office of the
Ombudsman

Yukon
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Comparison across Canada: Functions and Powers
British
Columbia
Representative
for Children
and Youth

Alberta

Saskatchewan

Manitoba

Ontario

Quebec

Nova Scotia

Commission
des droits de la
personne et
des droits de la
jeunesse


New
Brunswick
New
Brunswick
Child and
Youth
Advocate


Office of the
Child and
Youth
Advocate

Child’s
Advocate Office

Office of the
Children’s
Advocate

Office of the
Ombudsman

Newfoundlan
d & Labrador
Office of the
Child and
Youth
Advocate

Yukon
Office of the
Child and
Youth
Advocate







Individual/case
advocacy
Systemic advocacy









Office of the
Provincial
Advocate for
Children and
Youth






















Policy advocacy/
recommendation
Public reports







































Receive complaints
Investigate
complaints/
systemic matters
Access to
information





via Minister




































via Minister

























































Appoints
/
Underway




Right to
information
(s.23(1))
















?












Child and Youth
First Principles




Best interests






















Section 2(3)










Section
17(1)(b)

Subpoena power
Investigate deaths
Legal counsel


Right to
information
(s.10)




Consultation
processes
Child welfare
Child and Youth
Protection
Public education
Informed by UNCRC
principles









UNCRC as direct
influence





Mary Liston

Table 3
Model

Legal actors

Legal framework

Role of child
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International Models of Children’s Representatives80
British Columbia
Independent, standalone agency
accountable to
Parliament
Representative for
Children and Youth is a
Legislative Officer

Specialized statutory
regime blends
inquisitorial and
adversarial features but
does not provide legal
representation
Participatory,
represented, consulted

United States81
Panels of volunteers

United Kingdom82
Independent agency
accountable to Parliament

New Zealand
Independent Crown
agency

Germany
National association
of guardians ad litem

France
Special judicial system

Norway
Ombudsman
(1981)

Agencies recruit, train,
manage volunteers
(attorneys, social
workers, citizen
volunteers)
ADR model which
interacts with the
courts but does not
provide legal
representation

Children’s Commissioners
England (2004)
Scotland (2003)
Wales (2000)
Northern Ireland (2003)
Individual complaints
heard in Wales & Northern
Ireland; role in England is
to promote rather than
safeguard rights

Children’s
Commissioner (2003)

Voluntary
membership

Judge trained in child
rights

Appointed by the king

Self-regulating within
national standards but
limited accountability
and no state control

Operates within the
inquisitorial legal model

Operates within the
ombudsman model with
respect to public and
private institutions but
not family disputes

Represented,
consulted

Participatory, represented,
consulted

Specialized statutory
regime blends
inquisitorial and
adversarial features but
does not provide legal
representation
Participatory,
represented, consulted

Child has participatory
right to express views
directly to the judge
Carries less weight than
Art. 12

Represented, consulted,
less participatory

Shall have regard to or
must regard relevant
provision in England,
Wales, Northern Ireland;
mandatory in Scotland
Shall have regard to or
must regard relevant
provision

Participatory, less
represented,
consulted
Co-equal with Art. 12

Effectuate child’s will,
opinion, rights to
participation and selfdetermination

Legislation incorporates
Art. 12

Fully implements the
CRC

Convention Art.
3: best interests
of the child

Indirectly through
systemic advocacy

Primary

Convention Art.
12: ensure
procedural rights
and enhanced
representation

Indirectly by ensuring
child’s views/wishes are
effectively &
systematically
represented

Duties ranked with
best interests taking
priority over enhanced
representation &
participation

80
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Legislation incorporates
principle

Legislation incorporates
principle

Fully implements the
CRC

Modified and expanded table from Andy Bilson and Sue White, “Representing Children’s Views and Best Interests in Court: An International Comparison,”
(2005) 14 Child Abuse Review, 220-239.
81
Note that only the United States and Somalia have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
82
Until 2004, England’s model was an independent government agency employed guardians ad litem in conjunction with legal representation. Scotland
employed a panel of guardians as its model where local authorities recruited and administered lists of guardians (“Safeguarders”) who did not provide legal
representation.

